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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Consider a new software startup company, its employees working 
long hours to develop a software algorithm that will be bigger, better, 
and faster than the state-of-the-art already on the market.  Maybe it will 
allow traders to respond to changing financial markets a millisecond 
faster than their competitors, or it will help airlines plan more efficient 
routes to save billions of dollars in fuel each year.  The company believes 
this new algorithm will lead to an initial public offering worth tens of 
millions of dollars and early retirement.  But before it releases the 
software and changes the world, it wants patent protection.  It wants to 
prevent others from taking the same algorithm, packaging it with a 
slightly different product, and selling it for less because it had lower 
development costs.  The company consults with several patent lawyers 
and receives discouraging news.  In view of several recent Supreme 
Court decisions, most notably Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International1 in 
2014, this algorithm will be nearly impossible to patent.  This company 
cannot use patent protection to exclude others from using the algorithm, 
and the company’s success is suddenly highly uncertain.  What should 
the company do? 
These are difficult times for software companies seeking to protect 
their intellectual property.  The United States Supreme Court decided 
Alice in June 2014, holding that most computer software constitutes 
unpatentable abstract ideas.2  Alice has therefore made software patents 
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much more difficult to obtain and far easier to invalidate in the courts.  
This has driven software companies toward other forms of intellectual 
property protection for their software, including trade secrets.  Trade 
secrets differ from patents, however, in at least one very significant way.  
Patent protection lasts for a fixed amount of time,3 but once a trade secret 
is exposed, protection is lost forever.4  One legitimate way to determine a 
trade secret is through reverse engineering, so software companies 
turning to trade secrets must carefully protect their products against 
reverse engineering by competitors or else risk losing protection.5  Yet 
while patent protection for software faces more challenges than ever 
before, reverse engineering of software is becoming easier.6  Software 
companies therefore face significant challenges in protecting their 
intellectual property, as both patent protection and trade secret protection 
look increasingly weak. 
This Comment explores the extent to which software companies can 
go to prohibit reverse engineering of their marketed products in today’s 
legal climate.  As will be shown, while blanket prohibitions on reverse 
engineering will probably not succeed, software companies can likely 
use shrinkwrap agreements to ban reverse engineering for specific 
limited purposes such as direct economic competition. 
Part II of this Comment provides important background information.  
Part II.A contains an overview of key software concepts needed to 
understand the legal analysis that follows.  Part II.B contains a summary 
of the Supreme Court’s recent Alice decision and its impact in restricting 
patentability for software.  Part II.C begins with an overview of trade 
secret law and its application to software.  Part II.C.1 provides an 
overview of reverse engineering as a proper means of discerning trade 
secrets, and Part II.C.2 contains background on reverse engineering of 
software. 
Part III begins with a survey of recent results where courts have 
applied contract principles to intellectual property law.  Part III.A 
examines how the courts have applied contract principles to copyright 
law specifically.  Part III.B then examines the extension of these 
                                                          
States Patent and Trademark Office as a broad rebuke to software patents.  See infra Section II.B.  
 3.   Patents typically expire twenty years following the filing of the earliest related application, 
after which the protected invention is dedicated to the public.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2015 Supp.). 
 4.   E.g., 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.05(1), (2) (2017) 
[hereinafter MILGRIM] (describing loss of secrecy and subsequent termination of trade secret 
protection through sale, display, or circularization). 
 5.   Id. at § 1.05(5). 
 6.   See discussion infra Section II.C.2. 
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copyright precedents to trade secret law, challenges posed by existing 
patent law, and how software companies might apply contract principles 
to protect their trade secrets.  Part III.B.1 examines whether a total 
contractual ban on reverse engineering to discern trade secrets embedded 
in a software company’s product could succeed.  Part III.B.2 looks at the 
more reasonable option of a limited contractual ban, one that prohibits 
reverse engineering only for certain purposes.  Both case law (Part 
III.B.2.i) and statutory (Part III.B.2.ii) support for limited contractual 
bans are discussed. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Software, Generally 
A basic understanding of several major concepts in software is useful 
to understand recent developments in software patentability, as well as 
the benefits and challenges to protecting software with trade secrets.  The 
term “software” refers generally to the programs that direct the activities 
on a computer system.7  While there are many kinds of software, the 
focus here is on so-called “applications software.”  Applications software 
controls particular applications such as word processing, photo editing, 
e-mail management and so on.  These are the kinds of products that 
consumers tend to buy “off-the-shelf”8 to install on their computers to 
perform certain tasks. 
Software resides in a computer’s internal memory, and is generally 
placed there by transferring it from a disk or downloading it from a 
source such as the Cloud or the World Wide Web.  The stored software 
consists of instructions that tell the computer (specifically the computer’s 
processing unit) what to do.  Examples of basic instructions include 
adding two numbers, or moving a value from one memory location to 
another.  A typical application program is made up of many millions of 
such instructions. 
Ultimately humans write software to tell computers what to do 
through the process of programming.  Programming fundamentally 
“involves writing a program in some code or language that the computer 
                                                          
 7.   See generally RONALD J. TOCCI & FRANK J. AMBROSIO, MICROPROCESSORS AND 
MICROCOMPUTERS: HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 169 (6th ed. 2003) (providing a general overview 
of the types of software programs). 
 8.   Not to be taken literally, purchasing software “off-the-shelf” is understood to include 
downloading software from a website, which is now a common method of obtaining software. 
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can [understand].”9  Today’s computers are digital, rather than analog, 
devices.  Digital devices are designed to operate using voltage signals, 
which can have only two possible values: low voltage, represented by a 
zero, and high voltage, represented by a one.10  Human programmers can 
write programs consisting of instructions made up of ones and zeroes, 
but doing so is tedious and errors are nearly impossible to detect and 
fix.11 
Programmers therefore generally write computer programs in high-
level languages such as C++, Java, or Visual Basic.12  Such languages 
make programmers’ task much easier by using English-language words 
and combining many individual computer instructions into a single 
statement.13  Computers themselves do not understand the high-level 
language, however, so it must be translated into the strings of ones and 
zeroes that computers recognize.  For higher-performance applications, 
this is done through the process of compilation.  Compilers are 
themselves computer programs which take each high-level statement and 
translate it into the series of ones and zeroes that a particular computer 
understands.14  This new, translated program—sequences of ones and 
zeroes stored in the computer’s memory—is called an “object program” 
consisting of “object code.”15 
Because high-level languages use English-language constructs, a 
programmer should be able to understand the functionality of another 
programmer’s work simply by reviewing the high-level code.  By 
contrast, even a highly-experienced programmer probably would not 
understand the meaning of thousands or millions of strings of ones and 
zeroes—the object code—without a great deal of painstaking analysis.  
Microsoft Word, for instance, is written by programmers in the high-
level C++ language.16  Anyone with even a basic knowledge of 
programming would recognize much of the basic functionality of Word 
at this level.  Even the most experienced programmer, however, would 
find the object code virtually impenetrable.  The detailed programming 
methods used to solve the various problems that Word presents would be 
                                                          
 9.   TOCCI & AMBROSIO, supra note 7, at 170. 
 10.   See, e.g., id. at 35–36. 
 11.   Id. at 170–71. 
 12.   Id. at 174. 
 13.   Id. 
 14.   Id. at 175. 
 15.   See id. at 170. 
 16.   See, e.g., The Programming Languages Beacon, LEXTRAIT.COM (Mar. 5, 2016), 
http://www.lextrait.com/vincent/implementations.html (graphically indicating that Microsoft Office, 
which includes Word, is developed using C++). 
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almost totally obscured.  As will be shown, selling already-compiled 
code in object code format is a valuable way for software companies to 
protect the secrecy of their specific approaches to problem solving.17  
This has long been an alternative to patent protection, and is as important 
today as ever before in view of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice. 
B. The Impact of Alice 
The legal landscape for patenting software became much more 
difficult in 2014 when the United States Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.18  The Court in Alice 
established a much more stringent test for patentability that excludes 
many software algorithms.  Such algorithms often create competitive 
advantages in the marketplace, as when a company’s new algorithm 
leads to improvements in speed or memory use compared with its 
competitors.19  These advantages can be valuable intellectual property 
rights, but the patentability of many such algorithms is now highly 
questionable in the wake of Alice. 
The status of software patents prior to Alice was murky, but several 
major cases had suggested that software was generally patentable.  For 
instance, the Federal Circuit signaled its acceptance of business method 
patents in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 
Inc. in 1998.20  In doing so, it held that a computational method for 
transforming data into a final share price using a series of mathematical 
calculations was patent-eligible subject matter because that final share 
price was a “useful, concrete, and tangible result.”21  The Federal Circuit 
narrowed its view in In re Bilski in 2008, finding that the “useful, 
concrete, and tangible result” test on its own was insufficient for 
demonstrating patentability.22  It relied instead on the Supreme Court’s 
“machine-or-transformation” test, noting that when a process was not 
tied to a particular machine or apparatus (e.g., an algorithm to be run on 
a generic computer) the test for patentability was simply whether it 
                                                          
 17.   See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 18.   Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 19.   Relevancy is another example, as best illustrated by Google—its success stemmed largely 
from the fact that its PageRank algorithm returned more relevant results than the algorithms of its 
competitors.  See John Battelle, The Birth of Google, WIRED (Aug. 1, 2005, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2005/08/battelle/?tw=wn_tophead_4. 
 20.   State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 21.   Id. at 1375 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 22.   In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959–60 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 
U.S. 593 (2010). 
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transformed an article into a different state or thing.23  It further held that 
transformations of data, such as those that might be carried out by a 
software algorithm, were patentable under this test.24  Even when the 
Supreme Court scaled back patent protection for business methods in 
Bilski v. Kappos, finding that the patent statutes “[did] not suggest broad 
patentability of such claimed inventions,” the Court did not go so far as 
to restrict patentability for software.25  Rather, it referred to the machine-
or-transformation test as a “useful . . . investigative tool” for evaluating 
patent eligibility.26 
Alice changed all of this, as courts have generally interpreted the 
opinion as a major rebuke to software patents.27  Alice involved patent 
claims directed to mitigating so-called settlement risk, which is the risk 
that only one party to a financial exchange satisfies its obligation.28  The 
claims recited a computer system for exchanging financial obligations, 
including software for performing the exchange.29  In analyzing these 
claims, the Court relied on the two-part patentability test it set forth in 
Mayo v. Prometheus Labs.30  Under this test, one first determines 
whether the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.31  If so, 
one then determines whether the elements of the claim transform it into a 
patent-eligible application.32  Applying the first part of the test, the Court 
found that intermediated settlement by a third party is an abstract idea—a 
patent-ineligible concept.33  It then moved on to the second part of the 
test.  In applying the second part, the Court found that the patent claims 
were directed only to a generic computer implementation of 
intermediated risk, and therefore failed to transform the abstract idea into 
a patent-eligible invention.34 
                                                          
 23.   Id. at 962. 
 24.   See id. at 962–63 (describing how transforming raw data into a visual depiction of a 
tangible object, as in CT scanning, was patent-eligible). 
 25.   Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. at 608. 
 26.   Id. at 604. 
 27.   See infra notes 35–40 and accompanying text (discussing software patent challenges post-
Alice). 
 28.   Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2349 (2014). 
 29.   Id. 
 30.   Id. at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012)). 
 31.   Id. (noting that patent ineligible subject matter includes “laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas”). 
 32.   Id. 
 33.   Id. at 2356–57. 
 34.   Id. at 2360. 
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Although its ineligibility finding was limited to the claims at hand, 
courts have thus far interpreted Alice’s holding as a broad rebuke of 
software patents in general.  Within roughly two years of the Alice 
decision, 568 patents had been challenged on patentability grounds 
through motions citing Alice at the Patent Trial and Appeals Board 
(PTAB), district courts, and the Federal Circuit.35  Overall, these judicial 
bodies applied Alice to invalidate 378 patents and patent applications out 
of 568 considered in the two years following the decision, an invalidation 
rate of sixty-seven percent.36  The Federal Circuit has been particularly 
harsh on software patents, invalidating thirty-four of the thirty-seven 
software patents it examined under Alice within two years of the 
decision.37  Meanwhile, by June 2016 the USPTO had rejected more than 
36,000 patent applications over Alice, of which patent applicants had 
abandoned38 more than 5,000.39  Statistics from the USPTO further show 
that rejection rates for software-related patents spiked after Alice and 
remained high well into 2017.40 
Despite its force in invalidating software patents, the scope of Alice’s 
holding remains unclear.  The Supreme Court did not consider Alice to 
be a case about software patents, and the parties to the case agreed that 
Alice Corporation itself had never actually written software.41  It is the 
broad interpretation of Alice by both the Federal Circuit and lower 
courts—which have thus far interpreted it as a nearly per se rule against 
software patents—that has had such a profound effect.42  Despite its 
substantial impact, Alice is a short case (the Supreme Court considered it 
“minor”),43 and the Court spent very little time describing how to apply 
                                                          
 35.   Jasper L. Tran, Two Years After Alice v. CLS Bank, 98 J. OF THE PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 354, 358 (2016). 
 36.   Id. 
 37.   Id. 
 38.   To abandon a patent application means to cease pursuing a patent based on that 
application.  
 39.   Tran, supra note 35, at 358–59 (citing Robert R. Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of 
the Impact of a “Minor Case” (Part 2), FENWICK & WEST’S BILSKI BLOG (June 20, 2016), 
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/06/two-years-after-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-
case-part-2.html. 
 40.   Robert R. Sachs, #Alicestorm: April Update and the Impact of TC Heartland on Patent 
Eligibility, FENWICK & WEST’S BILSKI BLOG (June 1, 2017), http://www.bilskiblog.com/ 
blog/2017/06/alicestorm-april-update-and-the-impact-of-tc-heartland.html. 
 41.   Robert R. Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a “Minor Case” (Part 
1), FENWICK & WEST’S BILSKI BLOG (June 16, 2016), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/06/two-
years-after-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case.html. 
 42.   Id. 
 43.   Id. 
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each prong of its test.44  This is of no consolation to software companies, 
however, who may have difficulty protecting their algorithms and 
finding funding for new software ventures in the wake of so much 
uncertainty.45 
Alice does not appear to spell the end of software patents altogether.  
The Court seemed to leave open the possibility that claims that improve 
the functioning of the computer itself, or that improve on an existing 
technological process, are still patent eligible.46  The Federal Circuit has 
also recently upheld software patents in several high-profile cases.47  But 
these cases are the exception rather than the rule.  Both the federal 
district courts and the Federal Circuit have repeatedly struck down 
software patents as non-patentable subject matter in the wake of Alice, 
finding that the claims are directed to abstract ideas.48  With the Federal 
Circuit upholding just eight software patents in the more than three years 
since Alice,49 software companies are struggling to find other ways of 
protecting their intellectual property. 
Some software companies appear to be turning to copyright 
protection for their programs in the wake of Alice.  Congress amended 17 
U.S.C. § 101 in 1980 to expressly make software eligible for copyright,50 
so there seems to be little risk that the courts will clamp down on 
software copyrights as they have with patents.  There are advantages to 
copyrighting software, and in many instances this may be the preferred 
                                                          
 44.   See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014) (“[W]e need not 
labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.  It is enough to 
recognize that there is no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and 
the concept of intermediated settlement at issue here.”). 
 45.   See, e.g., Alice, Abstract Ideas, and Software-Related Patents, BERKELEY TECH. L. J.: 
BTLJ BLOG (Mar. 1, 2016), http://btlj.org/2016/03/alice-abstract-ideas-software-related-patents/.  
 46.   See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359–60 (noting that the claims were invalid in part because they 
did not “purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself or effect an improvement in any 
other technology or technical field”). 
 47.   See, e.g., Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 
1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that although claims directed to filtering of internet content were 
directed to an abstract idea, the claims improved on an existing technological process and therefore 
did not monopolize the abstract idea); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (upholding claims directed to a “self-referential” database table upon finding that they 
were directed to improving the functionality of the computer itself); DDR Holdings, LLC v. 
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (upholding claims directed to a web server 
on the basis that they were directed to a specific “Internet-centric problem” rather than an abstract 
idea). 
 48.   See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 49.   Sachs, supra note 40. 
 50.   See, e.g., Lawrence D. Graham & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Economically Efficient Treatment 
of Computer Software: Reverse Engineering, Protection, and Disclosure, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & 
TECH. L.J. 61, 91 (1996). 
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method of IP protection.  Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this 
Comment.  Yet copyright protection for software has at least two 
significant weaknesses.  First, one recent court decision appears to 
significantly expand fair use protections for copying software.51  Second, 
copyright protection in software is limited to an author’s original 
creations.  This means that coding constructs that are highly generic, or 
already in the public domain, do not receive protection and are therefore 
subject to copying by others.52  As a result, where generic constructs can 
be used to code specific algorithms, copyright protection might actually 
protect very little. 
The other main alternative to patents is trade secrets.  Alice has not 
altered trade secret protection in any way.  As this Comment will show, 
trade secrets can therefore be a valuable means for protecting software if 
used correctly. 
C. The Trade Secret (Plus Contract) Solution 
In view of tighter restrictions on software patents in the wake of 
Alice, software companies are increasingly turning to trade secrets to 
protect their valuable algorithms.53  But in doing so, such companies 
should consider the permissive posture of existing trade secret law 
toward reverse engineering.  Competitors, after all, may use reverse 
engineering to compromise the protections that software owners seek. 
Statutory trade secret protections have evolved substantially over the 
past eighty years.  Trade secret law was initially compiled in the first 
Restatement of Torts in 1939.54  But the primary source of trade secret 
law in most jurisdictions today is the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(UTSA), first promulgated in 1979 and now adopted by forty-seven 
                                                          
 51.   See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145601 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2016) (reiterating jury finding that Google’s copying of Oracle’s Java API was 
protected by fair use exceptions under copyright law), appeal docketed and consolidated with No. 
17-1118 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2016). 
 52.   See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 714–15 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(noting that “elements taken from the public domain do not qualify for copyright protection” and 
finding no copyright violation). 
 53.   See, e.g., Ryan Davis, Attorneys Lean Toward Trade Secrets to Avoid Alice Headaches, 
LAW360 (July 17, 2015, 3:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/666273/attys-lean-toward-
trade-secrets-to-avoid-alice-headaches (describing general strategy shift toward embracing trade 
secrets for software in view of Alice); Stephanie Forshee, In Fintech, Trade Secrets May Be 
Replacing Patent Applications, CORPORATECOUNSEL (June 21, 2017), 
http://www.law.com/corpcounsel/almID/1202790865489/ (describing a shift away from patent 
applications and toward trade secrets in the financial technology industry and attributing it to Alice). 
 54.   See MILGRIM, supra note 4, § 1.01(2)(c)(i) (2017). 
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states and the District of Columbia.55  The UTSA defines a trade secret 
as information, including a program, method, or process, that “derives 
independent economic value . . . from not being generally known to . . . 
[or] readily ascertainable by” other persons using proper means.56  Those 
“other persons” must further benefit in some way from use of the trade 
secret.57  The UTSA further requires that trade secret owners make 
“efforts . . . reasonable under the circumstances to maintain [this] 
secrecy.”58  Computer software is well suited to these UTSA 
requirements.  First, the UTSA definition expressly encompasses 
programs, and extends also to methods and processes which are often 
embodied in software algorithms.  Second, distribution of software in 
object code format generally meets the basic requirement of maintaining 
secrecy because it is not easily decipherable to human readers.59 
The UTSA defines trade secret misappropriation generally as the 
acquisition of another’s trade secret by one who knows or had reason to 
know the acquisition was by improper means, or the disclosure or use of 
another’s trade secret without express or implied consent where the trade 
secret was acquired through improper means.60  “Improper means” 
generally refers to theft, bribery, misrepresentation, and even legal 
actions that fall below generally accepted standards of commercial 
conduct.61 
Trade secret protection historically existed almost entirely at the state 
level until Congress enacted the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act 
(DTSA) in May 2016.62  The DTSA provides a federal cause of action 
for trade secret misappropriation.63  It closely mirrors the UTSA, and the 
two acts define “trade secret” and “misappropriation” almost 
                                                          
 55.   Id. at § 1.01(2)(b). 
 56.   UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(4)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1985). 
 57.   See id. 
 58.   Id. § 1(4)(ii). 
 59.   See, e.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F. Supp. 340, 359 (D. 
Mass. 1993) (“Even those who obtained [the software] and were able to use [it] were unable to 
discover its trade secrets because [the software] was distributed only in its object code form, which 
is essentially unintelligible to humans.”). 
 60.   See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2). 
 61.   Id. at § 1(1). 
 62.   Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2(f), 130 Stat. 376, 382 (2016) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836–1839). 
 63.   MARK L. KROTOSKI ET AL., MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, THE LANDMARK DEFEND 
TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 2016 at 7 (2016), https://www.morganlewis.com/~/media/files/publication/ 
morgan%20lewis%20title/white%20paper/the-landmark-defend-trade-secrets-act-of-2016-
may2016.ashx?la=en.  
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identically.64  Under the DTSA, a trade secret owner can bring an action 
in federal court if the trade secret is related to a product or service used 
in interstate or foreign commerce.65  Notably, the DTSA expressly states 
that it does not preempt state trade secret law.66  Trade secret owners can 
therefore choose whether to bring an action in state court under state law 
or in federal court under the DTSA.67 
1. Reverse Engineering in Trade Secret Law 
The issue of reverse engineering has a long history in trade secret 
law.  Reverse engineering is defined as “starting with the known product 
and working backward to find the method by which it was developed,”68 
and courts have traditionally recognized reverse engineering as a proper 
means of learning trade secrets.  In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., for 
instance, the United States Supreme Court explained that trade secret law 
does not protect against discoveries by fair and honest means including 
“so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known product 
and working backward to divine the process which aided in its 
development or manufacture.”69 
A more detailed treatment of reverse engineering comes from 
Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, where plaintiff lock company sued 
defendant locksmiths for trade secret misappropriation when the 
defendants compiled a list of key codes for the plaintiff’s locks by 
contacting other locksmiths who had already picked the locks.70  The 
court held not only that the reverse engineering by individual locksmiths 
was not misappropriation, but that the sharing of the key codes with 
other locksmiths was not misappropriation either.71  The court concluded 
by noting that to hold otherwise would bring state trade secret protection 
into line with the absolute monopoly afforded by patents and lead to 
preemption by federal patent law.72 
The UTSA does not expressly address reverse engineering in its 
statutory language, but the Comments state that reverse engineering is an 
                                                          
 64.   Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3), (5) (West Supp. 2016), with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 
§ 1(1), (2). 
 65.   18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West Supp. 2016). 
 66.   18 U.S.C.A. § 1838 (West Supp. 2016). 
 67.   KROTOSKI ET AL., supra note 63, at 7–8. 
 68.   UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 
 69.   Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). 
 70.   Chi. Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 402–03 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 71.   Id. at 405. 
 72.   Id. 
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appropriate means of discerning a trade secret.  Section 1 of the UTSA 
defines “trade secret” in terms of a requirement that the secret be “not . . . 
readily ascertainable by proper means.”73  The comments to the statute 
include the following statement: 
Proper means include: . . . 2. Discovery by “reverse 
engineering”, that is, by starting with the known product 
and working backward to find the method by which it 
was developed.  The acquisition of the known product 
must, of course, also be by a fair and honest means, such 
as purchase of the item on the open market for reverse 
engineering to be lawful . . . .74 
The federal DTSA takes the UTSA one step further by expressly 
addressing reverse engineering in the statutory language.  After defining 
“misappropriation” in terms of acquisition or disclosure using improper 
means, the DTSA defines “improper means” as including “theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to 
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.”75  It 
then expressly excludes reverse engineering from “improper means,” 
stating that the term “improper means” does not include “reverse 
engineering, independent derivation, or any other lawful means of 
acquisition . . . .”76  The trend is therefore clear: the courts have long held 
that reverse engineering is a legitimate means of acquiring trade secrets, 
the UTSA recognized this when defining trade secrets, and the federal 
government has recently emphasized this in the DTSA. 
2. Reverse Engineering of Software 
Computer software is unique in that it cannot simply be taken apart 
and examined physically like the locks in Chicago Lock.  As discussed 
earlier, software companies typically compile their source code into 
object code prior to distributing it.77  Courts have generally held that 
distribution of this object code reflects a sufficient effort to maintain 
secrecy because unlike the original source code, this object code is 
indecipherable to human readers.78  Object code, however, can be reverse 
                                                          
 73.   UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i). 
 74.   Id. § 1 cmt. 
 75.   18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(6)(A) (West Supp. 2016). 
 76.   Id. § 1839(6)(B). 
 77.  See supra Section II.A. 
 78.   See, e.g., Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 663–64, 663 n.8 (4th Cir. 
1993) (determining that the object code at issue met the definitional requirements for a trade secret); 
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engineered through computational processes to produce a rough copy of 
the algorithms in the original source code; this process is often referred 
to as “disassembly” or “decompilation.”79  While the reproduction is far 
from exact, this rough copy may be sufficient for the reverse engineering 
party to discern what makes the software faster or more efficient.  A 
software company might have patented such information prior to Alice, 
and now might wish to protect it as a trade secret.  If the information is 
discerned through reverse engineering, however, trade secret protection 
is no longer available and the software company may lose a valuable 
edge on its competitors. 
Past scholarship has largely dismissed decompilation as a legitimate 
threat to software trade secrets owing to the time, effort, and expense 
required.80  But it is time to reexamine the risks of decompilation in view 
of recent technological advances.  As an example, consider the Java 
programming language.  Like C or C++, Java is a high-level 
programming language that must be compiled (translated) into something 
the computer’s processor understands before the code is run on that 
computer.  Unlike C and C++, however, Java is compiled into an 
intermediate version of object code called Java bytecode prior to 
distribution over the web.81  Final compilation occurs on any machine 
running software called the Java Virtual Machine (JVM).82  Java 
bytecode is platform independent, meaning that the same high-level Java 
source code can be partially compiled into Java bytecode and distributed 
to many different types of machines, each of which then finishes the 
compilation process.83 
This platform-independence makes Java very flexible and therefore a 
favorite for web-related applications because the same code can run on 
many different types of machines.  But it also makes Java particularly 
vulnerable to reverse engineering.84  The same tools readily available to 
                                                          
Q-Co Indus. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“Only the object code is 
publically [sic] available; this [is] the version of the program that is intended to be read by the 
computer and cannot be understood even by expert programmers.”).  
 79.   See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1608–09 (2002) (explaining how engineers can use disassembly 
or decompilation to “discern or deduce internal design details of the program”). 
 80.   See, e.g., id. at 1613–14. 
 81.   Stephen Rauh, A Java Programmer’s Guide to Byte Code, BEYOND JAVA (Jan. 5, 2015), 
https://www.beyondjava.net/blog/java-programmers-guide-java-byte-code/. 
 82.   See id. 
 83.   See id. 
 84.   See, e.g., Ajay Yadav, Java Bytecode Reverse Engineering, INFOSEC INST.(Jan. 31, 2014), 
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/java-bytecode-reverse-engineering (“It is relatively easy to 
disassemble the bytecode of a Java application, compared to other binaries.”). 
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help Java users run Java bytecode through the JVM can also be used for 
disassembly as part of the reverse engineering process.  Disassembly is, 
after all, essentially the opposite of compilation.  And because Java end-
users are closer to the compilation process, they have easier access to 
disassembly tools.  The Eclipse integrated development environment 
(IDE) is one example of freely downloadable software that can be used 
to disassemble Java bytecode and potentially reverse engineer web 
applications software.85 
While the object code associated with other high-level languages 
such as C or C++ tends to be more resistant to reverse engineering than 
Java, sophisticated disassembly tools exist for these languages as well, 
and skilled software engineers may be able to reproduce the basic 
functionality of a program written in these languages.  Snowman, for 
instance, is a new C/C++ decompiler that can be used to translate object 
code into human-readable source code.86  As with many decompilers, 
Snowman’s developers advertise the product toward computer virus 
analysts as well as persons who have simply lost their source code.87  But 
the product is not limited to these uses, and competitors could just as 
easily use it to discern a software company’s protected algorithms 
through reverse engineering. 
Software companies seeking to protect their intellectual property 
therefore face a major challenge—just as heightened patentability 
standards push them toward trade secret protection, advances in reverse 
engineering of software make it more difficult to protect their trade 
secrets.  And these companies cannot rely on trade secret law to justify 
such bans.  If intellectual property law alone won’t sufficiently protect 
software companies looking to protect their investments post-Alice, then 
where should they turn?  The answer, as argued here, may be contract 
law as applied to trade secrets. 
III. ANALYSIS 
When the courts have considered intellectual property protection in 
the context of contract law, rather than intellectual property law, the 
results have sometimes been more favorable to the holders of the 
                                                          
 85.   Download Eclipse Technology That Is Right for You, ECLIPSE, https://www.eclipse.org/ 
downloads/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017). 
 86.   Snowman, DEREVENETS.COM (June 6, 2017, 11:14 PM), http://derevenets.com/. 
 87.   Paul Krill, C/C++ Decompiler Translates Programs, No Source Code Needed, 
INFOWORLD (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2833714/c-plus-plus/snowman-
seeks-to-be-llvm-for-decompilers.html.  
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intellectual property rights.  It was not always that way.  In 1988, in 
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., the Fifth Circuit invalidated a 
Louisiana statute that allowed shrinkwrap licenses88 to prohibit reverse 
engineering of software for adaptability purposes.89  The Fifth Circuit 
held that the provision in question “‘touche[d] upon an area’ of federal 
copyright law” and was therefore preempted by the federal Copyright 
Act.90  This marked a significant setback for holders of intellectual 
property rights in software. 
Although the next notable case did not involve a statute or reverse 
engineering, and so was not directly relevant to the holding in Vault, 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg raised the hopes of software companies by 
holding that shrinkwrap licenses were not per se invalid.91  There the 
Seventh Circuit upheld a shrinkwrap license on a software box 
instructing purchasers that they were bound by the terms of a license 
inside the box, including a term barring non-commercial uses of the 
software.92  Building on ProCD, two more recent cases directly 
disagreed with Vault by upholding similar prohibitions against reverse 
engineering in shrinkwrap software licenses.  In 2003, in Bowers v. 
Baystate Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit relied on ProCD in 
upholding a shrinkwrap provision prohibiting reverse engineering.93  And 
in 2005, in Davidson & Associates v. Jung, the Eighth Circuit closely 
followed Bowers in upholding a similar shrinkwrap provision prohibiting 
reverse engineering for interoperability purposes.94 
The common theme of shrinkwrap licenses across these cases is no 
coincidence.  As the cases demonstrate, software companies have tried to 
circumvent historically permissive policies toward reverse engineering 
software by relying instead on contract principles.  Meanwhile, the issue 
of reverse engineering software has heightened relevance today.  As 
software companies in an unfriendly patent landscape increasingly turn 
to trade secrets to protect their algorithms, they must deal with the very 
real possibility that competitors in the industry will reverse engineer their 
products to reveal their trade secrets and use those secrets to compete 
                                                          
 88.   A shrinkwrap license is a message printed on the outside of software packaging notifying 
users that they will be bound by license terms once they open the package.  More common today are 
electronic versions requiring users to click a button on their computer or handheld screen to agree to 
terms; these are generally referred to as point-and-click agreements or clickwrap licenses.   
 89.   Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 90.   Id. 
 91.   ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 92.   Id. at 1448–50. 
 93.   Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 94.   Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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directly.  The courts seem loath to restrict reverse engineering and the 
DTSA reflects this permissive approach. 
Shrinkwrap license provisions prohibiting reverse engineering for 
certain purposes offer another path.  The law is unsettled here, as the 
cases described above demonstrate.  The Fifth Circuit has held that 
shrinkwrap provisions prohibiting reverse engineering are invalid, yet the 
Federal Circuit and Eighth Circuit appear to allow them.  Furthermore, 
those cases examined the relationship between shrinkwrap prohibitions 
on reverse engineering and copyright, not trade secrets.  The key 
question, therefore, is just how far software companies can push these 
shrinkwrap licenses to protect their trade secrets from reverse 
engineering. 
A. Case Law Applying Contract Principles to the Protection of 
Intellectual Property 
To understand the extent to which software companies might rely on 
contract principles to protect their trade secrets, it is useful to first review 
the key cases in which software owners have used shrinkwrap terms—
successfully or not—to protect their products. 
1.  Vault v. Quaid 
In Vault v. Quaid, the Fifth Circuit held that a Louisiana licensing 
statute permitting shrinkwrap licenses to restrict reverse engineering was 
preempted by federal copyright law.95  Vault produced computer 
diskettes containing copyrighted code to prevent unauthorized 
duplication of other companies’ software programs.96  Vault included a 
license agreement with each software package prohibiting “copying, 
modification, translation, decompilation or disassembly of [its] 
program.”97  Quaid produced and sold diskettes containing a feature 
specifically designed to unlock Vault’s protection.98  Quaid did not 
dispute that it had developed its own program by reverse engineering 
Vault’s,99 which violated the terms of the shrinkwrap agreement. 
Vault sued, alleging that Quaid breached the license agreement by 
reverse engineering Vault’s software in violation of the Louisiana 
                                                          
 95.   Vault, 847 F.2d at 270. 
 96.   Id. at 256. 
 97.   Id. at 257. 
 98.   Id. 
 99.   Id. 
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Software License Enforcement Act (LSLEA).100  Under the LSLEA, 
software producers such as Vault could impose certain contractual terms 
on purchasers so long as the license agreement accompanied the 
producer’s software.101  Among those terms was one prohibiting 
“adaptation by reverse engineering, decompilation or disassembly.”102 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found the statute invalid and the license 
therefore unenforceable, holding that certain provisions of the statute 
“‘touched upon the area’ of federal copyright law” and were therefore 
preempted by it.103  The Fifth Circuit specifically noted that § 117 of the 
Copyright Act permits an owner of a computer program to adapt that 
program for certain purposes.104  The court held that the LSLEA 
provision prohibiting adaptation by reverse engineering touched upon 
this particular area of federal copyright law and was preempted by it.105 
2. ProCD v. Zeidenberg 
While Vault examined a specific provision in a software license, the 
seminal case examining enforceability of software shrinkwrap licenses in 
other contexts is ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.106  There the Seventh 
Circuit held that consumers purchasing off-the-shelf software products 
were bound by the terms of the license agreements inside.107  ProCD 
compiled listings from various telephone books into a computer database 
and sold the software to both commercial and private consumers so they 
could look up listings by simply querying the database.108  It placed a 
message on every consumer software box stating that the buyer was 
bound by restrictions in an enclosed license, including a prohibition on 
using the application for non-commercial purposes.109  But Matthew 
Zeidenberg did just that—he bought a consumer package and ignored the 
enclosed license terms, setting up a corporation to resell ProCD’s listing 
                                                          
 100.   Id. at 268. 
 101.   Id. 
 102.   Id. at 268–69. 
 103.   Id. at 269–70. 
 104.   Id. 
 105.   Id. 
 106.   86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 107.   Id. at 1448–49. 
 108.   Id. at 1449. 
 109.   Id. at 1450. 
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information to other companies for a profit.110  ProCD sued, claiming 
that Zeidenberg had violated the license terms.111 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the license on the basic 
contract principle of mutual assent, holding that the Uniform 
Commercial Code did not preclude binding a purchaser to license terms 
hidden within packaging.112  More relevant to the trade secret issue, 
however, was the court’s examination of preemption.  The district court 
concluded that the shrinkwrap license was unenforceable in view of § 
301(a) of the Copyright Act,113 which states in part that: 
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any 
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of 
copyright as specified by section 106 in works of 
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression and come within the subject matter of 
copyright . . . are governed exclusively by this title.114 
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that rights created by contract 
are not “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope 
of copyright,” and that there was therefore no preemption of state 
contract laws.115  It reasoned that the exclusive rights described in the 
Copyright Act are rights against the world—all persons are forbidden 
from copying copyrighted material, whether they agree to it or not.116  
Contract rights, by contrast, affect only the parties to the contract and are 
therefore not “exclusive.”117  As such, shrinkwrap terms restricting 
certain uses of enclosed software were enforceable.118 
3. Bowers v. Baystate 
Although the Fifth Circuit in Vault held that a license provision 
prohibiting certain kinds of reverse engineering was unenforceable, the 
momentum has ultimately shifted from licensees back toward licensors 
on the issue of reverse engineering.  Bowers marked the start of that 
shift.  In Bowers, the Federal Circuit held that federal copyright law did 
                                                          
 110.   Id. 
 111.   Id. 
 112.   Id. at 1452–53. 
 113.   Id. at 1454. 
 114.   17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 115.   ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012)). 
 116.   Id. 
 117.   Id. 
 118.   See id. at 1455. 
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not preempt shrinkwrap license terms prohibiting reverse engineering.119  
Harold Bowers invented an improvement for computer aided design 
(CAD) software, which he bundled with related software and sold with a 
shrinkwrap license prohibiting all reverse engineering.120  Baystate was a 
competitor in the CAD industry.121  Shortly after Bowers began selling 
his bundle, Baystate acquired copies of it and within months had 
introduced its own substantially revised product incorporating features of 
Bowers’s improvements.122  Bowers brought breach of contract claims 
against Baystate for violating the terms of the shrinkwrap agreement.123 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied First Circuit law in deciding 
the contract issue because that issue was not unique to its own 
jurisdiction.124  Baystate argued that the shrinkwrap reverse engineering 
prohibition was preempted by the Copyright Act, but the Federal Circuit 
disagreed and affirmed the district court’s judgment.125  The Federal 
Circuit noted its respect for freedom of contract before squarely 
addressing the preemption issue.126  It explained that § 301(a) of the 
Copyright Act (requiring that all exclusive rights within the general 
scope of copyright were governed exclusively by the Act) did not require 
preemption so long as a state cause of action required some non-illusory 
extra element.127  It relied in part on ProCD’s holding that shrinkwrap 
licenses were not preempted by federal copyright law, noting the Seventh 
Circuit’s observation that a copyright is a right against the world while 
contracts bind only their parties.128  And it distinguished Vault on the 
basis that it was limited to a state law prohibiting copying of a computer 
program rather than “private contractual agreements supported by mutual 
assent and consideration.”129  It therefore held that Bowers’s license 
terms forbidding reverse engineering were enforceable, and that Baystate 
was liable for breach of contract.130 
                                                          
 119.   Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 120.   Id. at 1320–22. 
 121.   See id. at 1322. 
 122.   Id. 
 123.   See id. 
 124.   Id. at 1322–23. 
 125.   Id. at 1323. 
 126.   Id. at 1323–24. 
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 128.   Id. (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 129.   Id. at 1325. 
 130.   Id. at 1326. 
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Judge Dyk dissented on the preemption issue, noting that the 
majority’s holding conflicted with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Vault 
and expressing concern that this logic threatened copyright policies 
generally.131  He disagreed that shrinkwrap agreements were freely 
negotiated, likening them instead to contracts of adhesion where 
purchasers had no other choice but to enter into the contract or avoid 
buying the product altogether.132  And he disagreed with the majority’s 
reasoning that there was any difference between preemption of a state 
statute, as in Vault, and general common law contract principles.133 
The Federal Circuit’s majority opinion in Bowers has proved 
controversial.134  Nonetheless, other circuits have followed it as best 
illustrated by Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung.135  In Davidson, the 
defendants violated the terms of a shrinkwrap agreement when they 
reverse engineered the plaintiff’s software to construct an emulator 
whereby plaintiff’s games could be played for free.136  The defendants 
relied on Vault in arguing that the Copyright Act preempted the 
plaintiff’s state law breach-of-contract claims.137  But the Eighth Circuit 
sided with the plaintiffs, finding the contract provision valid and 
enforceable.138  As in Bowers, the court distinguished Vault on the basis 
that it addressed a particular state statute rather than a state law contract 
issue.139  And it expressly relied on Bowers in determining that the 
defendants could contractually forego their reverse engineering rights 
under the Copyright Act.140  It concluded that the defendants had indeed 
relinquished their reverse engineering rights when they agreed to the 
plaintiff’s end-user license agreement (EULA), and that the defendants 
therefore breached the agreement.141 
The facts underlying the reverse engineering in Davidson were 
strikingly similar to those of an earlier copyright case where the court 
reached the opposite result.  In Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. 
Connectix Corp., Sony sued after Connectix reverse engineered Sony’s 
                                                          
 131.   Id. at 1335 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 132.   Id. at 1337. 
 133.   Id. 
 134.   See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Fostering the Business of Innovation: The Untold 
Story of Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 445, 446–47 (2012). 
 135.   422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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PlayStation software to emulate the PlayStation on other platforms.142  
The Ninth Circuit held that the fair use exception to the Copyright Act 
protected the defendant’s reverse engineering.143  The key distinction 
between the cases, however, is that Sony did not involve a shrinkwrap 
agreement.  The Eighth Circuit reached its conclusion in Davidson by 
applying contract principles, holding that the defendants breached the 
EULA when they reverse engineered the plaintiff’s product. 
Bowers and Davidson represent an encouraging trend for software 
companies seeking to protect their intellectual property through 
shrinkwrap agreements prohibiting reverse engineering.  First the Federal 
Circuit, and then the Eighth Circuit, upheld broad prohibitions on reverse 
engineering, finding no preemption by federal copyright law.  Yet these 
cases represent the positions of only two circuits—Vault is still the law in 
the Fifth Circuit, despite being nearly thirty years old.  Furthermore, 
these cases applied copyright law rather than trade secret law, so exactly 
how these Circuits might handle trade secret protection is unclear.  The 
following sections explore how software companies might best approach 
trade secret protection to maximize their chances of having contractual 
reverse engineering restrictions upheld by the courts. 
B. Application to Trade Secret Law 
In considering how contract principles apply to trade secrets, it is 
first important to note that contracts inherently play a more important 
role in trade secrets than they do in copyright or patent law.  The UTSA, 
for instance, defines “improper means” as including “breach or 
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy.”144  The DTSA, 
which is closely based on the UTSA, contains identical language.145  
Therefore when one party knows that it is receiving secret information 
from another, and expressly agrees to keep it secret by not performing 
reverse engineering, such contractual terms are generally enforceable.146  
Disclosure of trade secrets in violation of non-compete clauses and other 
similar contractual provisions between employees and their former 
employers comprises the vast majority of trade secret litigation.147  At 
                                                          
 142.   Sony Comput. Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2000) (by 
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first blush, then, contractual provisions further limiting trade secret 
disclosure, such as through reverse engineering, seem to fit well in trade 
secret law, perhaps even better than with copyrights. 
Can it be this simple?  Can software companies simply argue that 
preemption by the DTSA is not an issue, and count on the courts to 
extend Bowers and Davidson to trade secret protection?  Unfortunately 
for software owners, probably not.  Breach of contractual agreements to 
maintain secrecy is part of the definition of trade secret misappropriation, 
but trade secret law has always taken a permissive approach toward 
reverse engineering.148  Banning reverse engineering outright, even 
through contract, would therefore run counter to many decades of 
precedent in this area. 
Shrinkwrap agreements also present unique problems.  First, some 
courts might follow Judge Dyk and refuse to enforce them on the basis 
that they are contracts of adhesion.  Fortunately for software owners, 
Judge Dyk’s opinion appears to be the minority view.  The majorities in 
Bowers and Davidson had no issue upholding a shrinkwrap agreement, 
and even the Fifth Circuit in Vault struck down the agreement on 
grounds of preemption rather than adhesion.  Some members of the U.S. 
Supreme Court have also indicated that such contracts are enforceable so 
long as they are reasonable.149 
The more significant problem with shrinkwrap agreements, and the 
one considered here, is that wide distribution of a software program with 
a shrinkwrap agreement prohibiting reverse engineering may be 
challenged as an improper attempt to extend a monopoly right that is 
only granted by patents, not trade secrets.  Patents are more closely 
related to trade secrets than copyrights because patents and trade secrets 
cover very similar subject matter.  Copyrights are limited to artistic 
expression; they cannot cover ideas or anything having utility.150  
Patents, by contrast, can cover “anything under the sun made by man.”151  
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According to the DTSA, trade secrets can cover “all forms and types of 
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering 
information.”152  There is therefore substantial overlap between patent 
and trade secret protections, and the more relevant question in assessing 
the validity of shrinkwrap agreements in the trade secret context may be 
preemption by federal patent law rather than copyright law.  As 
discussed below, the best solution to all of these problems may be a 
narrow shrinkwrap provision that prohibits reverse engineering only for 
certain purposes.  To get there, however, it is necessary to first consider 
the merits of a complete contractual ban on reverse engineering to 
discern trade secrets in software. 
1. Total Contractual Ban on Reverse Engineering 
The first question for software companies to consider is whether a 
shrinkwrap license prohibiting reverse engineering of trade secret-
protected code for any purpose whatsoever would survive judicial 
scrutiny.  As discussed above, the courts have thus far only analyzed this 
question in the context of federal copyright law, not trade secret law.153  
Vault, Bowers, and Davidson were copyright cases, and there is no 
indication that the plaintiffs ever argued that their software was a trade 
secret or that the defendants had misappropriated it. 
The first issue with a total contractual ban on reverse engineering to 
discern trade secrets is whether it might be preempted by federal trade 
secret law, just as Vault, Bowers, and Davidson examined preemption of 
contractual bans by federal copyright law.  Federal trade secret law is 
now governed by the DTSA, which is closely modeled on the UTSA.  
Unlike the UTSA, however, the DTSA expressly excludes reverse 
engineering from “improper means,” meaning that reverse engineering is 
a legitimate means of discerning trade secrets under federal law.154 
As for preemption, the DTSA states that “this chapter [18 U.S.C. §§ 
1831 et seq.] shall not be construed to preempt or displace any other 
remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by United States Federal, 
State, commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the 
misappropriation of a trade secret.”155  This passage has not yet been 
tested in the courts, but it appears from the plain meaning that the non-
preemption condition is limited to state trade secret law and therefore 
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would not extend to contractual bans.  But it expressly states that it does 
not affect state law trade secret protections, showing that it is meant to 
coexist with state protections and have a much narrower scope than, for 
instance, federal patent law.  More broadly, a software company trying to 
protect its trade secrets through a contractual ban on reverse engineering 
could still rely on ProCD to argue that trade secret rights, like rights 
under the Copyright Act, are rights against the world.156  Trade secret 
rights, after all, “restrict the options of persons who are strangers to the 
author.”157  Therefore the additional contractual ban could be justified 
under the logic of ProCD. 
Although software companies seeking to protect their trade secrets 
through contractual bans on reverse engineering have strong arguments 
that there is no preemption by federal trade secret law, preemption by 
federal patent law is altogether different and much more challenging.  
Two major Supreme Court decisions examining preemption by patent 
law, Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. and Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., illustrate the likely challenges such a ban would 
face.158 
In Bonito Boats, the Court struck down a Florida statute prohibiting 
the use of a particular molding process used to duplicate unpatented boat 
hulls.159  In doing so, the Court noted that the Patent Clause of the United 
States Constitution carefully balances monopoly rights that stifle 
competition against public disclosure that allows for a competitive 
economy.160  The Court further noted the importance of committing an 
invention to the public after its patent expires, faulting the statute for 
protecting unpatented designs in perpetuity.161  The Court rejected the 
respondent’s argument that the Florida law at issue was needed to protect 
against “unfair competition.”162  The Court held instead that the law was 
preempted by federal patent law because it upset patent law’s balance of 
rights by providing a monopoly right in a substantive idea with no return 
for the public.163 
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Despite the Court’s emphasis on the delicate balance of rights 
established by patent law, software companies can likely distinguish a 
total contractual ban on reverse engineering from Bonito Boats.  To do 
so, they could point to the Court’s emphasis on the importance of 
disclosure to the public in exchange for the monopolistic right to exclude 
others from using an invention.164  The Court described this exchange in 
stating that “[a] state law that substantially interferes with the enjoyment 
of an unpatented . . . conception which has been freely disclosed by its 
author to the public at large impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal 
of public disclosure and use which is the centerpiece of federal patent 
policy.”165  Patent law does indeed have substantial public disclosure 
requirements.  It requires that a patent specification contain a written 
description clearly disclosing the patentable aspects of the invention, and 
that all patent claims be sufficiently enabled by the patent specification 
such that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field can make and use 
the invention.166  But trade secret law points the opposite way, requiring 
privacy rather than public disclosure.  Specifically, the UTSA requires 
that trade secret owners take reasonable measures to maintain secrecy,167 
and courts have held that shipping software in object code format meets 
that requirement.168  Software companies can therefore distinguish their 
trade secrets from the publicly displayed boat hulls in Bonito Boats by 
pointing out that trade secrets are not in the “public domain.”  Rather, 
trade secrets are necessarily subject to efforts to maintain secrecy from 
the public, specifically by circulating the software as indecipherable 
object code.  Extending protections for trade secrets, for instance by 
using shrinkwrap agreements to ban reverse engineering, therefore does 
not upset the delicate balance of patent law in the way that the Court 
feared it would. 
Other parts of Bonito Boats are more difficult to distinguish, 
however, particularly when contemplating a shrinkwrap provision 
imposing a total ban on reverse engineering.  Although Bonito Boats did 
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not directly concern trade secrets, the Court addressed the close 
relationship between trade secrets and reverse engineering in its 
reasoning.  It faulted the Florida law for prohibiting the public from 
engaging in reverse engineering of products, noting that such 
prohibitions had never been part of state trade secret law.169  And the 
Court specifically cited Kewanee as standing for the proposition that 
trade secret law does not protect against discovery by reverse 
engineering.170  Some authors therefore cite Bonito Boats as a reason for 
prohibiting bans on reverse engineering in relation to trade secrets.171 
Kewanee provides a similar perspective on blanket contractual bans 
on reverse engineering of trade secrets, and probably stands as the 
greatest impediment to such a ban.  There the Court held that federal 
patent law did not preempt Ohio trade secret law because trade secret 
protection is so much weaker than patent protection.172  As an example of 
this relative weakness, the Court explained that reverse engineering was 
a proper means of obtaining trade secrets, but was not a justification for 
patent infringement.173  Trade secret law, the Court went on, therefore 
functioned more like a “sieve” compared with patent law’s “barrier.”174  
Banning reverse engineering outright would seem to convert the sieve 
into a barrier and might lead courts to conclude that such bans, even 
though rooted in contract, are preempted by federal patent law. 
While the Supreme Court has not addressed trade secrets and 
preemption by patent law in any detail since Bonito Boats and Kewanee, 
other courts have noted that those decisions make it unlikely that a total 
contractual ban on reverse engineering to discern trade secrets would 
survive.  In DVD Copy Control v. Bunner, for instance, the California 
Supreme Court relied on Bonito Boats in dicta when it found that 
banning reverse engineering of trade secrets through contract (in this 
case, by using a form contract to redefine “improper means” of 
determining trade secrets to include reverse engineering) would probably 
be preempted by federal patent law.175  Software companies seeking to 
protect their trade secrets are therefore unlikely to succeed in completely 
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banning reverse engineering of their products through shrinkwrap 
agreements. 
2. Limited Contractual Ban on Reverse Engineering 
Software companies need not advocate for a blanket ban on reverse 
engineering, however.  They could instead include a term in a 
shrinkwrap agreement that bans reverse engineering of the software for 
specific limited purposes such as direct economic competition.  Such a 
limited ban would be easier to distinguish from both Kewanee and 
Bonito Boats, and there are statutory analogues in copyright law to which 
software companies could point as well. 
a. Case Law 
The greatest case law challenges even to a limited contractual ban on 
reverse engineering are still Bonito Boats and Kewanee.  Those two cases 
are closely intertwined because Bonito Boats relied extensively on 
Kewanee, particularly when addressing the prohibitions on reverse 
engineering that the Supreme Court ultimately found improper.176  
Kewanee appears to be the greatest obstacle to a total contractual ban on 
reverse engineering because it would strengthen the protections of trade 
secret law too much.  But a far more limited and narrowly targeted 
contractual ban on reverse engineering would strengthen trade secret law 
only slightly.  If the shrinkwrap provision prohibited reverse engineering 
only for direct economic competition, the public would still have the 
benefit of reverse engineering for adaptability and other purposes. 
In Kewanee, the Court noted that trade secret law’s permissive 
approach toward reverse engineering distinguished it from patent law, 
but the Court did not address the degree to which reverse engineering 
might be restricted.  In Bonito Boats, the Court appeared to go beyond 
Kewanee by laying out in more detail what sorts of bans on reverse 
engineering would be preempted by patent law.  Specifically, the Court 
suggested that even limited bans on reverse engineering might be 
problematic.177  According to the Court, that the Florida statute did not 
remove all means of reproduction was not enough to save it.178  The 
Court described the law as prohibiting the public from engaging in “a 
form of reverse engineering of a product in the public domain,” and said 
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that this was a right of a patent holder, but was not part of trade secret 
law.179  The Court went on to address benefits of reverse engineering, 
specifically noting that it could lead to “significant advances in 
technology” by incentivizing the inventor to continue to make 
improvements and receive a patent.180 
Even here, software companies seeking to protect their trade secrets 
from reverse engineering should find it easier to distinguish a limited ban 
than a broad one.  As with the total ban, these companies could point out 
that their underlying algorithms are not in the “public domain” in the 
conventional sense, because they are circulated in an obfuscated form.  
This measure is enough to qualify for trade secret protection, so it can 
hardly be said to be public in the same way that the boat hulls in Bonito 
Boats were placed in plain view.  Second, these companies can point out 
that prohibiting reverse engineering for a narrow purpose, such as direct 
economic competition, does not frustrate innovation because other 
companies would still be free to reverse engineer the software to improve 
upon it.  This still doesn’t offer software companies the level of 
protection they might have had in these algorithms before Alice, but it 
offers additional protection nonetheless.  Furthermore, the impact of 
Alice is ultimately the key point—in a post-Alice world, these contractual 
trade secret protections still do not rise to the level of patent protection 
and therefore are not preempted by federal patent law. 
Finally, any defendant accused of violating such a shrinkwrap 
provision to discern trade secrets would almost certainly rely on Vault.  It 
is the primary case from the circuit courts that invalidated shrinkwrap 
provisions prohibiting reverse engineering because they were preempted 
by federal intellectual property law, and it appears to still be good law in 
the Fifth Circuit.  However, the Federal Circuit in Bowers may have 
interpreted Vault too broadly, and software companies seeking to protect 
their trade secrets could urge a narrower interpretation. 
Vault is often characterized as holding that a state law prohibiting all 
copying of a computer program is preempted by the Copyright Act.181  
But the statutory language at issue in Vault was actually much narrower.  
The LSLEA specifically prohibited “adaptation by reverse engineering, 
decompilation or disassembly,” that is, modifying the software to serve 
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some independent purpose.182  But the LSLEA did not address reverse 
engineering in any other context.183  The Fifth Circuit focused heavily on 
this “adaptation” language in its preemption finding.  For instance, it 
pointed to § 117 of the Copyright Act which it noted “permits an owner 
of a computer program to make an adaptation of that program . . . .”184  It 
emphasized the adaptation limitation yet again in restating its holding 
when it said “[t]he provision in Louisiana’s License Act, which permits a 
software producer to prohibit the adaptation of its licensed computer 
program by decompilation or disassembly, conflicts with the rights of 
computer program owners under § 117 and clearly ‘touches upon an 
area’ of federal copyright law.”185 
Had the LSLEA allowed shrinkwrap agreements to prohibit reverse 
engineering of a computer program for the narrower purpose of creating 
a directly competing version, it is less clear how the Fifth Circuit would 
have ruled.  The Copyright Act does not expressly address the creation of 
directly competing products in any of its fair use provisions.  
Furthermore, prohibiting software owners from barring direct copying 
runs counter to the control that the Copyright Act provides authors and 
artists to determine how their work is reproduced and disseminated.  The 
Fifth Circuit might well have found that such a version of the LSLEA 
statute—and therefore the license—was valid. 
b. Statute 
Moving beyond case law, at least one statutory analog suggests that a 
limited ban is viable.  The Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), 
passed into law in 1998, amended U.S.C. Title 17 to add restrictions on 
circumvention of access control measures.186  The DMCA effectively 
barred reverse engineering for the purpose of circumventing access 
controls by expressly permitting reverse engineering only if it was used 
for interoperability purposes traditionally covered by fair use.187  With 
the DMCA, Congress responded to the concerns of game developers and 
other software companies that their competitors, and in many cases their 
customers, were circumventing access controls to create free versions of 
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protected software.188  The DMCA’s restrictions on reverse engineering 
were directed at stopping such circumvention.189  Although it included 
fair use exceptions similar to those in the existing Copyright Act, such as 
for interoperability, the existence of the DMCA demonstrates that the 
federal government is concerned about certain kinds of competition 
arising from reverse engineering. 
The competition that gave rise to the DMCA was similar to the 
problem software companies likely face from competitors looking to 
steal their trade secrets, in that it involved direct economic competition 
and lost profits.  The DMCA suggests that the government is at least 
somewhat sympathetic to this problem and willing to restrict certain 
kinds of reverse engineering to address it.  Although no comparable 
statute exists for trade secrets, software companies seeking to protect 
their secrets through limited contractual bans on reverse engineering for 
direct economic competition could point to the DMCA as an example of 
a successful approach that balances incentives for innovation against 
complete monopolies. 
But just how far might a contractual ban on reverse engineering 
reasonably go?  There is no fair use provision in trade secret law 
comparable to the express fair use provisions of the Copyright Act and 
its amendments, so it is difficult to know just where the line would be 
drawn even if a court followed Vault rather than Bowers.  One software-
related argument for fair use in the copyright context is that copyright 
protects only expression and not ideas.  Banning reverse engineering of 
copyrighted software therefore improperly protects unprotectable ideas 
along with protectable expression.190  Trade secrets, unlike copyrights, 
can protect ideas—the UTSA and DTSA include devices, methods, 
techniques, and processes as protectable subject matter, all of which 
embody ideas.191  There is therefore less need for fair use in trade secrets.  
This may weigh toward upholding broader bans on reverse engineering 
in the trade secret context, and is at least another way for software 
companies to distinguish the copyright analysis in Vault. 
In view of these arguments and the various cases distinguished, 
limited contractual bans on reverse engineering appear likely to pass 
                                                          
 188.   Donna L. Lee, Comment, Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs Under the DMCA: 
Recognizing a “Fair Access” Defense, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 537, 550 (2006). 
 189.   Id. at 552–53.  
 190.   See MILGRIM, supra note 4, § 1.05(5)(II)(2) (explaining how prohibiting decompilation 
might allow copyright owners to monopolize ideas and expression). 
 191.   18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3) (West Supp. 2016); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 
AMENDMENTS § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
2017 REVERSE ENGINEERING AND TRADE SECRETS POST-ALICE 457 
judicial scrutiny.  Software companies should be cautious, however, not 
to extend their bans too broadly. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank dealt a 
significant blow to software companies looking to protect their 
intellectual property, but trade secrets appear to offer a way forward.  As 
these companies evaluate how to protect their software algorithms as 
trade secrets, they should consider how best to prevent competitors from 
reverse engineering their products.  Trade secret law does not itself 
protect against reverse engineering, but contract law can.  In applying 
contract principles, software companies would do best to avoid total bans 
on reverse engineering.  But selective bans on reverse engineering for 
certain purposes such as development of directly competing products 
appear much more likely to survive judicial scrutiny.  They are consistent 
with recent Circuit decisions in copyright law, do not directly contravene 
any statutes, and appear to avoid the most significant public policy 
concerns regarding reverse engineering. 
A more limited ban does not create a monopoly right on par with the 
near-total exclusive rights that patent protection confers, and therefore 
should not conflict with Bonito Boats while respecting the more tenuous 
nature of trade secret protections versus patent rights described in 
Kewanee.  Such a limited ban therefore seems to strike a balance 
between good policy and conformance with case law and statute.  
Software companies looking to protect their investments in the wake of 
Alice might do well to start there. 
 
